Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, Accuracy, and Eyewitness Identification by Clark, Steven E et al.
UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 8
Issue 1 Law and Social Science Article 5
1-2018
Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, Accuracy, and
Eyewitness Identification
Steven E. Clark





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by
an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Steven E. Clark, Molly B. Moreland & Rakel P. Larson, Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, Accuracy, and Eyewitness Identification, 8 U.C.
Irvine L. Rev. 41 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol8/iss1/5





Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, Accuracy, 
and Eyewitness Identification  
 
Steven E. Clark* 
Molly B. Moreland** 
Rakel P. Larson*** 
  Errors of eyewitness identification have motivated a national 
movement in the United States to reform police procedures that are used to 
obtain eyewitness identification evidence and legal procedures that regulate the 
use of that evidence in legal proceedings. These reforms, and eyewitness 
procedures in general, have been evaluated primarily by the single metric of 
accuracy—the accuracy of the evidence and the accuracy of legal outcomes 
based on that evidence. This focus on accuracy contrasts with a large body of 
research that emphasizes procedural justice and the legitimacy of legal 
authorities and institutions. This Article develops a Legitimacy Model for 
eyewitness identification based on the effectiveness of police and legal 
institutions and the procedural justice inherent in the interactions between 
eyewitnesses and law enforcement. Section I describes the basic procedures for 
eyewitness identification in real criminal investigations and experimental 
simulations; Sections II and III develop a framework for eyewitness 
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identification based on legitimacy, which is assumed to have two components, 
effectiveness and procedural justice. Section IV applies this framework to 
eyewitness identification procedures and reform, and Section V reflects on the 
utility and challenges associated with the legitimacy framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Eyewitnesses make mistakes. They sometimes fail to identify the guilty, and 
they sometimes falsely identify the innocent. The social science and legal scholarship 
on eyewitness identification has focused mostly on this second kind of error, and it 
is not hard to see why. Several archival analyses have provided converging evidence 
that false eyewitness identification is one of the primary evidentiary causes of false 
convictions in the United States.1 This clear link between false identifications and 
 
1. See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (Yale Univ. Press 1932); EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED 
BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER 
TRIAL (Nat’l Inst. of Justice 1996); SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1989–2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2012). 
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false convictions, combined with over one hundred years of research on human 
memory and decision-making, has driven a movement to reform the police 
procedures that control how eyewitness identification evidence is obtained and the 
legal procedures that regulate how that evidence is evaluated by legal decision-
makers. 
These reforms have been evaluated almost entirely by a single metric—the 
expected accuracy of the identification evidence and the expected accuracy of the 
outcomes of downstream legal procedures that rely on that evidence.2 The 
argument, simply put, is that identification evidence obtained with the 
recommended procedures will be more accurate than identification evidence 
obtained with non-recommended procedures.3 And legal outcomes will be more 
accurate when they rely on evidence obtained with the recommended procedures 
than when they rely on evidence obtained with the non-recommended procedures.4 
This focus on accuracy is essential to the justice system5 and consistent with  
U.S. Supreme Court decisions stating that “reliability is the linchpin in determining 
the admissibility of identification testimony”6 and, “the basic purpose of a trial is 
the determination of the truth.”7 
However, this narrow focus on the accuracy of outcomes contrasts with well-
developed literatures in law, justice, political theory, and policing that emphasize the 
process and the legitimacy of the police and legal authorities rather than the outcomes 
of police investigations or legal proceedings.8 The purpose of this Article is to 
develop a theoretical framework for eyewitness identification based on 
psychological and normative concepts of legitimacy. 
 
2. See, e.g., Steven E. Clark et al., Eyewitness Identification and the Accuracy of the Criminal Justice 
System, 2 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 175 (2015); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 603 
(1998). 
3. Wells, supra note 2, at 637; Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative 
Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45 (2006). 
4. Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement 
Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 149–157 (2008); Brandon L. Garrett, 
Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 122–25 (2008). 
5. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (Harvard 
Univ. Press 2012). 
6. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). 
7. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). 
8. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (Yale Univ. Press 1990) [hereinafter TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW]; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of 
Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 311–13 (2003) [hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice]; Tom R. Tyler, 
Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 379–80, 388 
(2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Psychological Perspectives]. 
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Our framework builds on the foundational works of Beetham9 and Bottoms 
and Tankebe,10 and also the works of Tyler,11 Solum,12 and Wells, Steblay, and 
Dysart.13 At the core of our framework is Beetham’s theory of the Legitimation of 
Power.14 Beetham’s specific focus on power is critical for present concerns because 
of the government’s power to investigate and prosecute crime, to deny liberty and 
impose sanctions, and to authorize coercive force, if necessary, under its obligations 
to protect citizens from harm. Beetham’s theory was developed with tremendous 
scope, to define, “the basic criteria for legitimacy in all historical societies, past and 
present,”15 not simply in terms of what the law prescribes in a given society, but 
rather about “what it ought to prescribe.”16 According to Beetham, power is 
legitimate to the extent that: “(i) it conforms to established rules, (ii) the rules can 
be justified by reference to shared beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate, 
and (iii) there is evidence of consent of the subordinate to the particular power 
relation.”17 For present purposes, the most important of these three dimensions of 
legitimacy are the shared beliefs that provide the foundation for the rules for 
eyewitness identification procedures within a legitimate justice system. 
The specification of these shared beliefs is complicated by the fact that 
individuals may have internally-conflicting values, and those values are likely to vary 
across individuals. We will have more to say about these underlying principles later. 
For now, we follow the recent work of Bottoms and Tankebe who have developed 
and extended Beetham’s theory.18 In their framework, the legitimacy of legal 
authorities and institutions depends on both the effectiveness of the police and the 
procedural justice inherent in police-citizen interactions.19 Each of these 
components is described briefly. 
Effectiveness and Accuracy 
Effectiveness is often discussed in terms of satisfying the needs of the 
community,20 providing physical security and the conditions necessary to material 
 
9. DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 4–6, 15–22, 182–84 (Macmillan  
Educ. Ltd. 1991) [hereinafter BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1991)]; DAVID BEETHAM, 
THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 5–22, 183–85 (Palgrave Macmillan 2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter 
BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (2013)]. 
10. Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to 
Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119 (2012). 
11. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 8; Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 8; 
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 8. 
12. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 190 (2004). 
13. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Reforms: Are Suggestiveness-Induced Hits and 
Guesses True Hits?, 7 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 264 (2012). 
14. BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1991), supra note 9. 
15. Id. at 21. 
16. Id. at 5. 
17. Id. at 16. 
18. Bottoms & Tankebe, supra note 10. 
19. Id. at 145. 
20. JEAN-MARC COICAUD, LEGITIMACY AND POLITICS 34 (David Ames Curtis ed. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1997). 
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welfare,21 or in terms of “tackling gun crime,”22 “solving murders,”23 or controlling 
violent crime, gangs, and drugs.24 These descriptions of police effectiveness, to the 
extent that they focus on suppressing crime and convicting criminals, seem a bit 
one-sided with an emphasis on crime control over due process.25 However, 
effectiveness not only requires protecting citizens from criminals, but also requires 
protecting citizens from police and prosecutors who might falsely accuse them of 
being criminals. The criminal justice system cannot be viewed as effective unless it 
is also accurate, and accuracy not only requires that guilty people are convicted, but 
also that innocent people are not convicted.26 The critical importance of accuracy 
in a normative theory of legitimacy is expressed most clearly by Laudan: “Truth, 
while no guarantee of justice, is an essential precondition for it. Public legitimacy, 
as much as justice, demands accuracy in verdicts.”27 We would extend this point to 
note that the effectiveness of the criminal justice system also requires that the 
innocent are not needlessly pursued by the police or prosecuted. 
The measurement of accuracy may be viewed as both easy and nearly 
impossible. Accuracy is quite difficult to measure in real criminal cases because the 
ground truth of the suspect’s guilt is unknown. As a result, eyewitness research relies 
largely on the outcomes of experimental simulations of crimes, rather than the 
outcomes of actual crime investigations.28 The crimes are staged and the 
“perpetrator,” typically an actor and confederate of the experimenter, is known to 
a certainty, and thus the accuracy of given witness or jury decision is also known. 
However simple this may appear, the problem of measuring accuracy is not simple. 
First, one still needs a measure of overall accuracy that takes into account the 
different ways that a witness can be correct or incorrect (an issue over which there 
is considerable debate), and second, the accuracy from experimental studies needs 
to be translated to the expected accuracy in actual criminal investigations. 
We should also be clear that effectiveness does not reduce only to accuracy. 
Some errors may be more costly and problematic than others, and some errors may 
have more opportunity to occur than others.29 Effectiveness requires accuracy, but 
 
21. BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1991), supra note 9, at 183. 
22. Justice Tankebe, Viewing Things Differently: The Dimensions of Public Perceptions of Police 
Legitimacy, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 103, 116 (2013). 
23. Id. 
24. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (Russell Sage Found. 2002). 
25. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
26. LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006); Steven E. Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness 
Identification Reform: Psychological Science and Public Policy, 7 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 238 (2012); Erik 
Lillquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 897 (2007). 
27. LAUDAN, supra note 26, at 3. 
28. Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of Eyewitness 
Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 581 (2000). 
29. Regarding opportunity, the issue is about base rates, the proportion of identification 
procedures that include a guilty suspect relative to the proportion of identification procedures that 
include an innocent suspect. A false identification error can only occur if an innocent suspect is in the 
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also requires the right balance of different kinds of errors. To make this point 
concrete, most would likely agree that a false conviction of the innocent is a worse 
error than a false acquittal of the guilty.30 Thus, it is not enough to minimize the 
overall error rate; rather one needs to minimize the more costly error relative to the 
less costly error. 
Procedural Justice  
 The central premise of theories of procedural justice is that justice lies primarily 
in the process, rather than the outcomes. There is much debate about the extent to 
which procedural justice should be viewed as a subjective psychological construct 
that reflects what people believe, and how they feel about their interactions with 
authorities, or a normative construct that can be (and perhaps should be) derived 
from basic principles of justice rather than people’s subjective appraisals.31 
Psychological and normative theories of procedural justice have been developed, 
discussed, and applied in a wide range of criminal justice and organizational settings. 
However, a systematic and detailed theory of procedural justice has not, to our 
knowledge, been developed or applied specifically to eyewitness identification. The 
development and application of such a theory are both important and timely. 
Psychological theories of procedural justice focus on the quality of human 
interactions and relationships. Eyewitness identification is, at its core, an interaction 
between two people, a witness and a person conducting the identification, usually a 
police officer or detective. It is an interaction with profound consequences for a 
third person, the person who is suspected of the crime, who is often not present, 
not part of the interaction, and if present, has little say about the interaction or how 
the identification is conducted.32 The focus on procedural justice makes an 
important point that the nature of this interaction may have important implications 
beyond the accuracy of its outcome. 
The Importance of Legitimacy  
 In the broadest terms, the legitimacy of the government is essential to maintain 
social institutions and social order.33 More specific to the issue of eyewitnesses, the 
 
lineup, and a false non-identification error can only occur if a guilty suspect is in the lineup. See Clark, 
supra note 26, at 246–47. 
30. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (Univ. of 
Chi. Press) (1769); Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). 
31. See BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1991), supra note 9, at 3–15; Solum, supra 
note 12, at 265–66. 
32. As we will discuss later, identification procedures often use photographs rather than actual, 
live people; consequently, the suspect is often not present at the identification. A 2012 survey 
conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum reported that only 21.4% of police agencies that 
responded to the survey indicated that they conducted live lineups, and then only rarely—on average 
two per year. Although a suspect has the right to counsel at such a live lineup, the suspect does not 
have the right to refuse to participate. See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529 (1966). Also, although 
counsel may note concerns about the conduct of the lineup, for example regarding the appropriateness 
of the fillers, those conducting the lineup are not required to make changes based on those concerns. 
33. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 8; Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 8; 
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 8; TYLER & HUO, supra note 24. 
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two elements of legitimacy, effectiveness (which includes accuracy) and procedural 
justice, are assumed to play critical roles in the participation of eyewitnesses in the 
criminal justice system. Eyewitness participation in the justice system often requires 
a substantial commitment of time and energy, and may involve enormous personal 
risk. There is evidence to suggest that people are less likely to report crime34 and 
juries are less likely to convict35 to the extent that they do not trust the police and 
see them as legitimate legal authorities. 
Our conceptualization of legitimacy assumes that both components—
effectiveness and procedural justice—are necessary and that each component 
provides non-redundant, policy-relevant information. This non-redundancy seems 
like a reasonable assumption; however, it runs counter to the view that process and 
outcome are aligned such that just processes should lead to correct outcomes. An 
important implication of this view—that effectiveness and procedural justice are 
non-redundant and singly insufficient—is that analyses based on effectiveness and 
analyses based on procedural justice may not converge on the same policy answers. 
A procedure that increases accuracy and effectiveness may violate principles of 
procedural justice, and alternatively, a procedure deemed to be fair and just may 
result in a decrease in accuracy and effectiveness. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: following this brief 
Introduction, Section I describes the eyewitness identification paradigm and 
provides an overview of recommendations and reforms. Section II presents an 
effectiveness model for eyewitness identification based on accuracy and utility—
including its limitations for justice policy. Section III develops a procedural justice 
framework for eyewitness identification, and Section IV explores how the 
framework would apply to eyewitness identification reform. Section V reflects on 
the Utility of the Legitimacy Framework in shaping criminal justice policy on 
eyewitness identification. 
I. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND 
LABORATORY STUDIES 
A. Basic Procedures 
Our focus is on two identification procedures commonly used in police 
investigations: showups and lineups. In a showup procedure, the witness is 
 
34. See, e.g., Kristina Murphy & Adrian Cherney, Understanding Cooperation with Police in a 
Diverse Society, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 181 (2012); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of 
Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003); 
Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime 
in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008). These studies show a relationship between 
perceived legitimacy and citizens’ general willingness to report crime. See Tammy R. Kochel et al., 
Examining Police Effectiveness as a Precursor to Legitimacy and Cooperation with Police, 30 JUST. Q. 895 
(2013) for results showing a relationship between perceived legitimacy and the actual reporting of crime. 
35. Amy Farell et al., Juror Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities and Decision Making 
in Criminal Cases, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 773 (2013). 
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presented with a single suspect, who may be guilty or innocent, and a simple 
question: “Is this the person who committed the crime?” The showup goes by other 
names as well—field identification or curbside identification, for example—which 
conveys the fact that the procedure is typically conducted in the “field” where the 
suspect is detained by police. Showups are typically conducted when a suspect has 
been identified by police soon after the crime occurred.36 The prototypical case is a 
robbery, after which the victim immediately calls 911, police search the area and 
locate a person who matches the victim’s description of the perpetrator. The 
witness’s response may be categorized as shown in Table 1. A positive identification 
of a guilty suspect is called a correct identification, and a positive identification of an 
innocent suspect is called a false identification. A non-identification of a guilty suspect 
is called a false non-identification and a non-identification of an innocent suspect is 
called a correct non-identification. 
A typical lineup procedure also presents the witness with a single suspect, 
along with a number of other individuals called fillers, who are known to be 
innocent.37 Lineups may be conducted live, at the police department or jail, but are 
often conducted with a set of head-and-shoulders mugshots. They are sometimes 
called photo montages, or, given the standard practice of having five fillers with a 
single suspect, they are sometimes called “six-packs.”38 The response outcomes are 
categorized in the same way as outcomes for a showup, with the addition of a filler 
identification, which is always a known error. 
In real criminal investigations, it is difficult to know whether the suspect is 
guilty or innocent, which makes it difficult to “score” the data. Is a suspect 
identification a correct identification of the perpetrator or a false identification of 
an innocent person? Because of this ground truth uncertainty about the suspect’s 
guilt, most eyewitness identification research is conducted using a staged crime 
procedure. Sometimes the staged crime is presented to participants live, but quite 
often it is filmed and presented to participants on video. Importantly, because the 
crime is staged, the identity of the perpetrator is known to a certainty. 
B. Overview of Recommendations and Reforms 
Eyewitness research has long had a reform mission.39 The need for reform 
assumes that something is amiss, and that it can, and should be “fixed.” Social 
 
36. Richard Gonzalez et al., Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 64 J. PERSONALITY &  
SOC. PSYCH. 525, 525 (1993). 
37. GERARD MURPHY ET AL., NATIONAL SURVEY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
PROCEDURE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 1994–2012 141 (2014). 
38. Neal S. McNabb et al., Voluntary Adoption of Evidence-Based Practices by Local Law 
Enforcement: Eyewitness Identification Procedures in Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, 20 
J. GEND. RACE & JUST. 509, 514 (2017). 
39. See, e.g., Sheila M. Seelau & Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Research: The Other Mission, 
19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1995); Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System 
Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546 (1978). 
Final to Printer_Clark (2) (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2018  2:00 PM 
2018] LEGITIMACY AND EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 49 
scientists and legal scholars began documenting eyewitness errors in real cases40 and 
experimental simulations41 over one hundred years ago, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
took up the issue of eyewitness identification in three cases, The Wade Trilogy, in 
1967.42 However, little progress was made until the 1990s, when DNA analyses 
established a clear link between false identification and false convictions.43 The 
American Psychology and Law Society (APLS) commissioned a white paper to 
make recommendations for eyewitness identification procedures, which was 
published in 1998,44 and the Department of Justice formed a task force to make 
recommendations, which were published in 1999.45 Most recently, the issue came 
before a committee of the National Research Council, which released its report and 
recommendations in 2014.46 The recommendations for reform that have arisen 
from these publications are summarized below: 
1. Although not banned in any jurisdiction, the showup procedure has been 
“widely condemned” by legal scholars and social scientists.47 
2. Lineups should be constructed fairly in such a way that the suspect does not 
stand out, by selecting fillers that match the witness’s description of the 
perpetrator.48 
3. Witnesses should be provided with instructions that include the following: 
the perpetrator may not be in the lineup; it is as important to clear innocent 
persons from suspicion as to identify guilty parties, and the investigation 
will continue whether or not they make an identification.49 
 
40. See, e.g., COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE CASE OF MR. ADOLF BECK, REPORT FROM 
THE COMMITTEE; TOGETHER WITH MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, APPENDIX, AND FACSIMILES OF 
VARIOUS DOCUMENTS (1904). 
41. See, e.g., HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, The Memory of the Witness, in ON THE WITNESS STAND: 
ESSAYS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME 39, 45 (1908). 
42. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
43. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 1, at 24. 
44. Wells et al., supra note 2. 
45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 178240, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (1999). 
46. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION (2014). 
47. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; see also PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 28 (1965) (describing the showup procedure as “the most grossly suggestive 
identification procedure now or ever used by the police”); Nancy K. Steblay et al., Eyewitness  
Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 L. &  
HUM. BEHAV. 523, 539 (2003) (noting the “showup’s potential for suggestibility—which worries legal 
professionals and eyewitness experts”). 
48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 29. 
49. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 107; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, 
at 32. There are many variations on these recommended instructions. For example, Connecticut 
General Statute 54-1p includes an instruction that “the eyewitness should not feel compelled to make 
an identification” and “the eyewitness should take as much time as needed in making a decision.” 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1P (2012). 
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4. The members of a lineup should be presented sequentially, rather than 
simultaneously.50 
5. The lineup should be presented by a blind lineup administrator who is either 
uninvolved in the investigation (and thus blind to any information about 
the case) or is blinded as to the position of the suspect in the lineup.51 
6. Police should obtain a confidence statement from the witness at the time of 
the identification, but these statements of confidence should be treated 
cautiously by legal decision-makers.52 
These recommendations have been adopted through the formal process of 
state-level legislation, and through the less formal process of developing “best 
practices” at the local level.53 The primary stated goal for these reforms is that they 
increase the accuracy of eyewitness identification evidence and legal outcomes that 
rely on eyewitness evidence. Given the important role of accuracy, we need to have 
a clear model and clear measures of accuracy, which we turn to next. 
II. LEGITIMACY, ACCURACY, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION  
Our theoretical framework borrows heavily from signal detection theory, 
which was developed in the 1940s and 1950s and later applied to research in 
psychophysics,54 recognition memory,55 and many other decision tasks across a wide 
array of disciplines, including diagnostic medicine,56 violence risk analysis,57 crime 
 
50. See, e.g., Eyewitness Identification Reform Act of 2007, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(B)(2) 
(2017); Memorandum from John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney Gen., N.J., to Cty. Prosecutors et al. (Apr. 18, 
2001), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ38-V753]. 
51. See, e.g., Eyewitness Identification Reform Act of 2007, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(B)(1) 
(2017); Wells et al., supra note 2, at 627; Memorandum from John J. Farmer, Jr., supra note 50. 
52. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 32; Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, 
Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of 
Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 12 (2009) (“The problem with  
using eyewitness certainty as a second-prong reliability factor . . . is that it has already been 
determined . . . that a suggestive procedure was used . . . .”). 
53. The Innocence Project provides an overview of policy reforms for all fifty states. Policy 
Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/policy/ [https://perma.cc/5ES9-
YJX4] ( last visited Mar. 20, 2018). 
54. See DAVID M. GREEN & JOHN A. SWETS, SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY AND 
PSYCHOPHYSICS 1–2 (1966). 
55. See, e.g., James P. Egan, Recognition Memory and the Operating Characteristic, in HEARING  
& COMMC’N LAB., IND. UNIV., TECHNICAL NOTE AFCRC-TN-58-51, AD-152650 (1958);  
John T. Wixted, Dual-Process Theory and Signal-Detection Theory of Recognition Memory, 114 
 PSYCHOL. REV. 152, 152 (2007). 
56. See, e.g., Lee B. Lusted, Signal Detectability and Medical Decision-Making, 171 SCI. 1217, 1271 
(1971). 
57. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 
62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783 (1994); Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Violent 
Recidivism: Assessing Predicative Validity, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 737 (1995). 
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investigation,58 and criminal law.59 What all of these applications have in common 
is that there is a binary decision based on evidence that is variable and uncertain—
whether a particular stimulus has been presented, whether a test stimulus was 
presented before, whether a spot on an image shows a tumor (or just a shadow), 
whether an offender can be released, or whether a defendant is guilty. 
The model that we describe below is a variant of signal detection theory and 
closely follows the assumptions of a computational model called the WITNESS 
model.60 The model assumes that, at the time of the crime, the witness stores 
information about the perpetrator in memory.61 Some features of the perpetrator 
are stored correctly, some incorrectly, and some are not stored at all.62 Some of the 
information stored in memory will be lost or distorted as memories change or fade 
over time. Later, at the time of the identification, which may be minutes, days, or 
even years later, the witness’s identification decision is based on a memory-
matching process that compares the features of each lineup member to the features 
of the perpetrator that are stored in memory.63 For a one-person lineup, of course, 
only the suspect is compared to the witness’s memory trace for the perpetrator. For 
a lineup, all members of the lineup are compared to the witness’s memory trace for 
the perpetrator. These match values, which represent the similarity between each 
lineup member and the witness’s memory of the perpetrator, provide the basis for 
eyewitness identification decisions based on the witness’s decision rule. 
For a one-person showup, the decision rule is simple. If the match of the 
suspect to memory is sufficiently strong, the witness identifies that person as the 
perpetrator, and makes no identification otherwise. The decision rule for a lineup 
is a bit more complicated because there is more than one match value to be 
evaluated. As we will discuss later, there are many decision rules that could be used 
to make identification decisions for a lineup. For now, we will describe one very 
simple rule called the Best Above Criterion Rule, according to which the witness 
identifies the lineup member who is the best match to his or her memory of the 
perpetrator, provided that the match is sufficiently strong.64 At this level the model 
 
58. See, e.g., Craig Bennell et al., Addressing Problems with Traditional Crime Linking Methods 
Using Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 293 (2009). 
59. See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 26; Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique 
of the Supreme Court’s Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1987); 
Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of 
Proof, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 95 (1996); Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and 
the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002). 
60. See Steven E. Clark, A Memory and Decision Model for Eyewitness Identification, 17 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 629 (2003) [hereinafter Clark, Memory and Decision Model ]; Steven E. Clark  
et al., Probative Value of Absolute and Relative Judgments in Eyewitness Identification, 35 L. &  
HUM. BEHAV. 364 (2011) [hereinafter Clark, Probative Value]. 
61. See Clark, Memory and Decision Model, supra note 60, at 631. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 633. 
64. Id. at 651. 
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is very simple, but this level of description makes it difficult to know what the model 
predicts. For that we need more detail. 
The assumptions of the model are formalized quantitatively so that it may 
generate quantitative predictions that can be compared to experimental data. These 
comparisons between predictions and data provide insight into which of the 
model’s assumptions are correct and which are in need of revision. 
The model assumes that at the time of the identification, each feature of the 
perpetrator will be represented correctly in memory with some probability p. The 
value of p depends on the conditions of the witness’s observation, and is assumed 
to increase as the witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator improves. 
Generally speaking, one would expect the value of p to be higher if the witness sees 
the perpetrator for two minutes than if the witness sees the perpetrator for only a 
few seconds. The value of p is also affected by the passage of time, and is assumed 
to decrease as time passes. Finally, although it was not included in the original 
model, it is also reasonable to assume that the value of p is affected by errors in 
memory retrieval as well as errors in the matching process.65 
The probabilistic nature of memory produces variability in the match between 
a lineup member and the witness’s memory of the perpetrator. Thus, the match of 
a given lineup member is not represented by a single value, but rather by a 
distribution of values. These distributions, based on 10,000 simulations of the 
model, are illustrated in Figure 1. The relevant distributions for showups are shown 
on the left-hand side of the figure, and the relevant distributions for six-person 
lineups are shown on the right-hand side of the figure. In each case, better memory 
conditions are shown in the top of the figure and poorer memory conditions are 
shown in the bottom of the figure. 
For showups, the figure shows the match distributions for both guilty and 
innocent suspects. It is clear that on average, guilty suspects are more similar to the 
memory representation of the perpetrator than are innocent suspects, but the two 
distributions overlap such that some guilty suspects will match memory less well 
than some innocent suspects. This overlap in the distributions of match values for 
guilty and innocent suspects (shown in dark gray) represents the ability of the 
memory system to discriminate between guilty and innocent suspects. 
For lineups, the right-hand side of the figure shows the distributions for guilty 
and innocent suspects, for those cases in which the suspect is the best match (over 
the fillers). Discriminability between guilty and innocent suspects again depends on 
the overlap of the two distributions, but also depends on the probabilities that guilty 
and innocent suspects will be the best matches in their respective lineups. 
A complete description of the model requires a more precise description of 
the decision rules. Up to now, we have used the intuitive but rather vague wording 
 
65. The idea of retrieval errors in the matching process is similar to proposals made by  
Charles A. Goodsell et al., Exploring the Sequential Lineup Advantage Using WITNESS, 34 L. &  
HUM. BEHAV. 445, 448 (2010), and by John T. Wixted & Laura Mickes, A Signal-Detection-Based 
Diagnostic-Feature-Detection Model of Eyewitness Identification, 121 PSYCHOL. REV. 262, 263, 266 (2014). 
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that identifications are made if the match (or best match) is sufficiently strong. This 
sufficiency needs to be quantified. More formally, for showups, the suspect is 
identified if the match to memory exceeds a criterion value cs, illustrated in the 
figures by a vertical line. An identification is made if the match exceeds cs, and a 
non-identification decision is made if the match is lower than cs. Likewise, for 
lineups, the best matching lineup member (whether it is the suspect or a filler) is 
identified if the match exceeds cL, and a non-identification decision is made if the 
match is lower than cL. 
The placement of the decision criteria cS or cL may vary. A witness who feels 
compelled to make an identification is assumed to have a lower criterion than a 
witness who feels reluctant to make an identification. Importantly, the placement 
of the decision criterion has no effect on diagnostic accuracy (i.e., the ability to 
distinguish between suspects who are guilty and suspects who are innocent). 
Adjustments of the criterion do not change the overlap of the distributions. Rather, 
the placement of the criterion determines the kinds of errors witnesses will make. 
For example, as the criterion is shifted upward (to the right in the Figure), the false 
identification rate (for suspects who are innocent) will decrease, but the false non-
identification rate (for suspects who are guilty) will also increase. 
A. Accuracy 
The research and the reforms have focused largely on false identification 
errors, with less consideration of correct identifications.66 This emphasis is largely 
due to the enormous consequences of false identification errors, but it is also due 
in part to a widely-held assertion that false identification rates can be reduced with 
little or no loss of correct identifications.67 If this claim were true—that the reforms 
reduced the false identification rate with no loss of correct identifications—there 
would be no need to consider conflicting values, and a policy decision to not 
implement the reforms would be objectively irrational. However, this claim is 
unambiguously contradicted by data.68 To the contrary, correct and false 
identification rates generally covary, such that changes in identification procedures 
that reduce the false identification rate also reduce the correct identification rate.69 
Consequently, any measure of eyewitness identification accuracy must consider 
changes in both correct and false identification rates. 
There has been some controversy about how best to calculate accuracy,70 but 
two measures derived directly from signal detection theory are d′ and the area under 
 
66. See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE 
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995). 
67. See Wells et al., supra note 2, at 637. 
68. See Clark, supra note 26, at 238–39; Matthew A. Palmer & Neil Brewer, Sequential Lineup 
Presentation Promotes Less-Biased Criterion Setting but Does Not Improve Discriminability, 36 L. &  
HUM. BEHAV. 247, 247 (2012). 
69. Clark, supra note 26, at 239. 
70. See John T. Wixted & Laura Mickes, Evaluating Eyewitness Identification Procedures: ROC 
Analysis and Its Misconceptions, 4 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 318 (2015); John T. Wixted 
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the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve.71 A critically important 
property of these two measures is that they are either unaffected by criterion 
placement (d′ )  or they consider the wide range of possible criterion placements 
(area under the ROC curve). This contrasts with other measures of accuracy, such 
as the ratio of correct- to-false identification rates, which is biased such that the 
ratio becomes very large as responding becomes more conservative, even if 
diagnostic accuracy decreases.72 Conceptually, d′ is given by the difference in the 
means of the guilty and innocent distributions, divided by the standard deviation of 
the innocent distribution, µG – µI / σI.73 The calculation of d′ typically assumes that 
the distributions are normal with equal variances. With these simplifying 
assumptions, d’ is easily calculated as the difference between the z-transformed 
correct and false identification rates, d’ = z(C) – z(F). 
The second method plots the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve 
and then calculates the area under the curve (AUC). The ROC curve plots pairs of 
correct and false identification rates as the criterion varies from high (conservative) 
to low (liberal). Experimentally, this is often accomplished by asking participants to 
rate the confidence of their decisions. Confidence is a proxy for the underlying 
memory strength (or match-to-memory); thus, lineup members who match memory 
more closely will be identified with greater confidence than lineup members who 
match memory less closely. 
Figure 2 shows the ROC curves derived from the distributions for showups 
and lineups illustrated in Figure 1. Each point on the curve represents a pair of 
correct and false identification rates for a given criterion, ranging from the most 
conservative, in the lower-left corner, to the most liberal, shown in the upper-right 
corner. At the conservative end, witnesses make very few positive identifications, 
and at the upper-right, most liberal end of the curve, witnesses are making a very 
large number of positive identifications. Thus, the curve provides a family of correct 
and false identification rates across a range of possible criterion placements. The 
diagonal line in the Figure represents a complete lack of diagnostic accuracy where 
the correct and false identification rates are the same. High accuracy is shown to 
the extent that the curve pulls away from the diagonal line and toward the upper 
left-hand corner. We should point out that ROC curves typically extend from the 
lower-left corner, representing such conservative responding that both the true and 
false positive rates are zero, to the upper-right corner representing such liberal 
responding that the true and false positive rates are both 1.0. This is true for 
 
& Laura Mickes, ROC Analysis Measures Objective Discriminability for Any Eyewitness Identification 
Procedure, 4 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 329 (2015); cf. Gary L. Wells et al., ROC Analysis 
of Lineups Does Not Measure Underlying Discriminability and Has Limited Value, 4 J. APPLIED  
RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 313 (2015). 
71. For reviews of signal detection theory, see, e.g., NEIL A. MACMILLAN & C. DOUGLAS 
CREELMAN, DETECTION THEORY: A USER’S GUIDE (1991); THOMAS D. WICKENS, ELEMENTARY 
SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY (2002). 
72. See Clark, supra note 26, at 244. 
73. MACMILLAN & CREELMAN, supra note 71, at 8. 
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showups, but it is not true for lineups. The reason is that, for lineups, even if all 
witnesses make an identification of someone from the lineup, some of those 
identifications will be fillers, so the suspect ID rates will not reach 1.0, even when 
every witness makes a positive identification. 
As a general rule within this framework, the policy-maker should always prefer 
conditions that produce greater diagnostic accuracy, that is, conditions associated 
with the higher ROC curve.74 The criterion placement is a secondary consideration 
for the procedure that has the higher ROC, but is not relevant to the preference between 
procedures. There is little point in choosing a procedure that achieves a lower level 
of diagnostic accuracy and adjusting the criterion on a lower ROC. 
B. Utility 
It is important to note that the placement of the decision criterion is justice 
neutral. There is no point on the decision axis at which the criterion shifts from just 
to unjust or from legitimate to illegitimate. We will argue later that the justice issue 
is not about where the decision criterion is placed, but rather is about how the decision 
criterion is placed. Peterson, Birdsall, and Fox showed that one can determine the 
optimal criterion placement—that is, the criterion that maximizes expected utility—
based on the values of the outcomes and the guilty base rate (the proportion of 
identification procedures in which the suspect is guilty).75 The expected utility for a 
given identification procedure, with a given criterion, can be calculated in the 
standard way as the sum of outcome-value products. Thus, 
 
E(U) = [ p(CI)v(CI) – p(FN)v(FN)] p(g) + [ p(CN)v(CN) – p(FI)v(FI)] p(i), 
 
where E(U) refers to the expected utility, p(CI) denotes the probability of a correct 
identification, v(CI) denotes the value associated with a correct identification, 
p(FN) denotes the probability of a false non-identification, v(FN) denotes the value 
associated with a false non-identification, p(CN) denotes the probability of a correct 
non-identification, v(CN) denotes the value associated with a correct non-
identification, p(FI) denotes the probability of a false identification, and v(F) 
denotes the value associated with a false identification. The terms p(g) and p(i) are 
the base rates or proportions of identification procedures in which the suspect is 
guilty or innocent, where p(i) = 1 – p(g). We will have more to say about these base 
rates later. The calculation of expected utility is conceptually straightforward, but 
requires one to estimate the values of a large number of parameters: the probabilities 
of the various outcomes, the values associated with the possible outcomes, and the 
opportunities for the various outcomes as represented by the base rate parameters. 
As it turns out, this cumbersome calculation can be reduced to a two-parameter 
 
74. Clark et al., supra note 2, at 179. 
75. See W.W. Peterson, T.G. Birdsall & W.C. Fox, The Theory of Signal Detectability, 4 
TRANSACTIONS INST. RADIO ENGINEERS PROF. GROUP INFO. THEORY 171 (1954). 
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model that provides an objective preference rule for determining the optimal 
criterion placement.76 
For present purposes, and to map the classic Expected Utility Model to our 
Legitimacy Model, we will equate effectiveness with utility. Our conceptualization 
of effectiveness depends on diagnostic accuracy and optimal criterion placement 
based on expected utility. Put another way, the Effectiveness Model marries the 
Accuracy Model and the Expected Utility Model. 
C. Evaluation of the Effectiveness Model 
The Effectiveness Model accounts for a wide range of phenomena in memory 
and decision-making, suggesting that it captures important aspects of the 
psychological processes that underlie eyewitness identification decisions, and the 
Utility Model extends the Accuracy Model to provide a normative framework for 
policy decisions. The policy decision-maker necessarily maximizes utility if he or she 
follows a small number of “intuitively appealing” axioms, and the application of 
these axioms will maximize average utility in the long run.77 The utility model 
provides a clean, conceptual separation between diagnostic accuracy and criterion 
placement and clarifies and simplifies policy decisions. 
However, this framework also has a number of important limitations—some 
of which are close relatives of common criticisms associated with utilitarianism, and 
there is no point in reciting those criticisms here.78 More specific to the present 
application, the parameters of the Utility Model are difficult to measure and will 
certainly vary across circumstances. Specifically, one needs to know the correct and 
false identification rates, the guilty and innocent base rates, and the cost ratio for 
false identification and false non-identification errors. We consider these next. 
Estimates of Correct and False Identification Rates  
 The correct and false identification rates from actual criminal investigations 
are unknown, and thus, they are often estimated from experimental data. There are 
several reasons to question whether these data provide useful estimates of the 
correct and false identification rates that come from actual criminal investigations. 
Experimental simulations cannot capture the chaos, fear, and emotion experienced 
by a witness or victim of an actual crime. In addition, the amount of time that passes 
between the crime and the identification is much shorter in experimental 
simulations—often just a few minutes—than in actual criminal investigations.79 In 
addition, experimental witnesses know that their responses have no real-world 
 
76. See Clark, supra note 26, at 248 (based on derivations by Stephen J. Ceci & Richard  
D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL  
L. REV. 34, 71–84 (2000)). 
77. See DeKay, supra note 59, at 110; JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGANSTERN, 
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 617–28 (1953). 
78. But see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22–26 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999). 
79. Heather D. Flowe et al., Testing the Reflection Assumption (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
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consequences; a failure to identify the suspect in an experimental lineup does not 
unleash a dangerous person on the community or initiate the prosecution of an 
innocent person. Justice is neither carried nor miscarried in the experimental 
laboratory. 
It is difficult to know how these differences might distort the estimation of 
guilty-innocent discriminability in criminal investigations. One might expect 
differences in overall accuracy or differences in criterion placement to the extent 
that a real eyewitness may feel more or less compelled to make an identification 
than an experimental witness. However, neither of these factors should affect the 
relative differences in guilty-innocent discriminability. 
Consistent with this prediction (and the general principle underlying it), there 
is evidence that the patterns of results from experimental simulations align with 
analyses from actual criminal investigations. Specifically, identification procedures 
that show higher discriminability in experimental simulations also show higher 
discriminability in actual cases.80 This does not entirely put the issue to rest because 
discriminability in real cases is difficult to estimate, and there are too few studies of 
eyewitness identification in real criminal investigations. That said, the experimental 
data are the best measures of accuracy currently available, and they have been 
determined to be sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for the reforms that have 
been adopted in many state and local law enforcement jurisdictions.81 If we reject 
the estimates of diagnostic accuracy based on the correct and false identification 
rates obtained in experimental simulations, we would have little or no scientific 
basis to evaluate the reforms that have already been adopted, and eyewitness 
identification policy would be guided only by procedural justice considerations. 
We may carry on even if the experimental simulations do not provide perfect 
estimates of diagnostic accuracy in real criminal investigations. However, the guilty 
base rates and the values associated with the outcomes are more problematic. The 
guilty base rate can only be estimated from real criminal investigations (there is no 
naturally occurring guilty base rate in laboratory studies), and the cost ratios involve 
considerable objective and subjective assessment. 
Outcome Values  
 Objectively, one could (at least in theory) estimate some of the error costs in 
terms of the likelihood of correcting the error. The cost of a false identification 
error would be much reduced if such errors were routinely caught—contradicted 
by other evidence, or detected by police, attorneys, judges, or juries. Likewise, the 
cost of a false non-identification would be much reduced to the extent that the non-
 
80. Karen L. Amendola & John T. Wixted, Comparing the Diagnostic Accuracy of Suspect 
Identifications Made by Actual Eyewitnesses from Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups in a Randomized 
Field Trial, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 263 (2015); John T. Wixted et al., Estimating the 
Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications from Police Lineups, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 304 (2016). 
81. See, e.g., STATE OF WISCONSIN, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION (2005) (citing scientific research as the basis of policies and reforms); Memorandum 
from John J. Farmer, Jr., supra note 50 (same). 
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identified perpetrator would be brought to justice based on other evidence.82 One 
could also estimate the various objective monetized costs associated with criminal 
justice errors. 
The assessment of objective costs is a considerable task, but subjective 
assessments are arguably even more difficult. How does one estimate the cost 
associated with a false identification error that could potentially result in years in 
prison, or even an execution of an innocent person? How does one estimate the 
cost associated with a false non-identification that could potentially allow a 
dangerous criminal to commit acts of violence against other innocent persons? As 
Clark noted, these questions can be simplified—the five-parameter model (four 
outcome values and the guilty base rate) can be reduced to a two-parameter model 
(ratio-of-cost differences and the guilty base rate)—and yet the parameter 
estimation still defies objective calculation.83 We would all agree that a false 
conviction of the innocent is worse than a false acquittal of the guilty—if for no 
other reason than the false conviction will often involve a false acquittal—as the 
guilty go free while the innocent are convicted of their crimes. But, how much worse 
is a false identification than a false non-identification? We may be tempted to recite 
from Blackstone, “Better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer,”84 
but there is no law of nature that makes this 10:1 ratio objectively “true.” Indeed, 
in an expansive and somewhat tongue-in-cheek review, Volokh notes that this 
normative cost ratio has been declared to be as low as 1:1 and as high as 5000:1.85 
Our utility theory provides a clear and straightforward framework for assessing 
identification procedures, but requires parameter estimates that may be difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain. 
Even if we could produce justifiable estimates of the values associated with 
identification outcomes, they would certainly vary across circumstances in 
potentially troubling ways. For example, the cost of a false non-identification 
certainly depends on the number of potential victims in the perpetrator’s future. 
The cost associated with a non-identification of a serial murderer is surely greater 
than the cost of a non-identification of a one-off murderer, and therefore, all things 
being otherwise equal, the criterion for the identification of a serial murder suspect 
should be more liberal than the criterion for the identification of a one-off murder 
suspect.86 
 
82. For a comparison between cases in which errors were detected and corrected and cases in 
which errors were not detected (resulting in false convictions), see Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting 
Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471 (2014). 
83. See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 76; Clark, supra note 26. 
84. BLACKSTONE, supra note 30, at 352. 
85. Volokh, supra note 30. 
86. Larry Laudan has made a similar point about repeat offenders, whose research shows they 
are more likely to reoffend. Thus, the cost associated with the non-identification of a repeat offender 
is higher than the cost associated with the non-identification of a first-time offender. See Larry Laudan, 
Taking the Ratio of Differences Seriously: The Multiple Offender and the Standard of Proof, or, 
Different Strokes for Serial Folks 6 ( Jul. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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Guilty Base Rates 
 The guilty base rate is a critical parameter in this framework because it 
constrains the opportunities for false identifications and false non-identifications. 
This important parameter is both difficult to estimate87 and variable across 
jurisdictions, investigators, and cases. In addition, consideration of the guilty base 
rate leads to some strange policy prescriptions. Specifically, to maximize utility, a 
high guilty base rate should be associated with a more liberal criterion. This violates 
the normative view that evidence should be evaluated independently and would 
seem to make defendants pay a price for the crimes of those who have come before 
them. The policy to encourage witnesses to use a lower criterion based on a high 
base rate seems tantamount to telling the suspect, “Ninety percent of people in your 
shoes are guilty, so we’re going to ask the witness to apply a low bar for identifying 
you at the lineup!” 
It is important to note that the limitations associated with base rate and 
outcome values apply only to issues of criterion placement and are not relevant to 
considerations of diagnostic accuracy. The policy rule articulated earlier—to prefer 
identification procedures that produce the highest diagnostic accuracy (as measured 
by AUC or d’)—is unaffected by the twists and turns that arise from the base rates 
and outcome values. This is not to say that the limitations are so narrow that they 
can be ignored. They come into play primarily in the evaluation of reforms that have 
little or no effect on diagnostic accuracy, but have a large effect on criterion 
placement and the trade-off between false identifications and false non-
identifications. 
Up to now, the social values that we have discussed are those that attach to 
particular outcomes—for example, the social value that a false conviction of the 
innocent is worse than a false acquittal of the guilty. But there are other social values 
that do not attach to specific outcomes, and there may be cases where those values 
conflict with diagnostic accuracy. We turn our attention to those issues next, 
through two famously rhetorical questions: Laurence Tribe’s “Question of Regret” 
and Lawrence Solum’s “Hard Question of Procedural Justice.” 
Not all Incorrect Outcomes are Equally Bad: Tribe’s “Question of Regret” 
and Solum’s “Hard Question of Procedural Justice” 
How much would you regret the erroneous conviction of [a] defendant for 
armed robbery? . . . [t]he answer must surely be, “It depends.” It depends 
in part upon the character of the error itself . . . . And it depends even more 
significantly upon the process that led to the error; one cannot equate the 
lynching of an innocent man with his mistaken conviction after a fair trial. 
Indeed, it is at least arguable that there is nothing good or bad about any 
 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1431616 [https://perma.cc/H6JG-D9WC]. The Utility model would 
suggest that witnesses should set a lower criterion when the perpetrator is a repeat offender. 
87. But see Wixted, supra note 55. 
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trial outcome as such; that the process, and not the result in any particular 
case, is all-important.88 
Tribe’s answer to the “Question of Regret” illustrates the point that, although 
outcomes are important, (“To be sure, some concern for the mix of correct and 
erroneous outcomes operates as a constraint”),89 justice resides to a large extent in 
the process, such that not all errors, not even errors of the very same kind (i.e., a false 
conviction) have equal status. Tribe’s example speaks to Shklar’s distinction 
between misfortune and injustice.90 The conviction of an innocent person following 
a fair trial is certainly a misfortune, but perhaps not an injustice. We may think of it 
as a false conviction but not necessarily a wrongful conviction. The point is that not 
all errors are equally bad. 
More broadly, and perhaps more pointedly, Solum posed what he called, “The 
Hard Question of Procedural Justice”: “How can we regard ourselves as obligated 
by legitimate authority to comply with a judgment that we believe (or even know) 
to be in error with respect to the substantive merits?”91 Solum’s “Hard Question” 
is motivated by the view, which is certainly true, that error can never be fully 
vanquished from the justice system. Solum’s answer to the “Hard Question,” which 
he has articulated in considerable detail, begins much like Tribe’s. “Only just 
procedures can confer legitimate authority on incorrect outcomes.”92 
Not all Correct Outcomes are Equally Good: The “Or-Else” and “Red 
Arrow” Identification Procedures 
This last point returns us to eyewitness identification and two hypothetical 
cases from Clark93 and from Wells et al.94 Clark described the case in which a police 
officer, with a rational basis for believing the suspect to be guilty, pushes the witness 
to identify that suspect, “or else.”95 Wells et al. created a slightly more subtle version 
of the same problem with an example of a police lineup with a big, red arrow 
pointing at the suspect.96 To the extent that the police are correct (i.e., that the 
person they suspect is in fact guilty of the crime), the “Or-Else” and “Red Arrow” 
 
88. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84  
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1381 (1971). 
89. Id. 
90. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 51 (1990). 
91. Solum, supra note 12. 
92. Id. 
93. Clark, supra note 26, at 250. 
94. Wells et al., supra note 13. 
95. Eyewitnesses sometimes have their own legal predicaments that can be used as an “or else” 
lever. For example, a key witness in a Los Angeles homicide case had her own legal matters  
that were discussed by detectives prior to presenting the lineup. People v. Anthony, BA281845  
(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2005). The importance of her cooperation as a witness in a murder case was 
made very clear to her: “If [what you tell us is] important stuff that’s gonna help us convict a  
killer . . . we will definitely talk with the district attorney. . . .” Transcript of Interview at 67, People  
v. Anthony, BA281845 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2005). In another case, Jill Leovy describes how a gun 
charge was leveraged into a witness’s cooperation in a homicide investigation. JILL LEOVY, 
GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 164–66 (2015). 
96. Wells et al., supra note 13, at 267. 
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procedures will, more often than not, perhaps even most of the time, lead to a 
correct outcome. As a corollary to Solum’s “Hard Question” and Tribe’s “Question 
of Regret,” which illustrate that not all incorrect outcomes are equally bad, the 
hypothetical cases from Clark and Wells et al. illustrate that not all correct outcomes 
are equally good. Even without any deep ethical or legal analysis, these procedures 
seem unjust and obviously Wrong (capital W). Nonetheless, we must raise and 
answer the question: Why are they unjust and wrong? Pursuit of this question may 
at times seem like an academic adventure in describing the obvious; however, failure 
to pursue the question leaves us (researchers, courts, policy-makers, and 
practitioners) to rely on intuitionism and to simply make it up on the fly. To begin 
to address this question, we need to develop a theory of procedural justice for 
eyewitness identification. 
III. LEGITIMACY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Normative and psychological theories converge on a fundamental claim—that 
legitimacy is tied tightly to the procedural justice inherent in the interactions 
between individuals. In the next Section, we describe Tom Tyler’s psychological 
theory of legitimacy and procedural justice, including the limitations that motivate 
a less subjective, more normative approach to legitimacy as it relates to eyewitness 
identification. 
A. Psychological Theory of Procedural Justice 
Psychological theories of procedural justice focus on people’s preferences 
regarding legal procedures, their interactions with legal authorities, and their 
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about legal actors and authorities.97 The most 
prominent, well-developed theory, and most relevant to the present enterprise,  
is Tyler’s Process-Based Model of Regulation,98 which provides a detailed 
psychological account of the relationships between procedural justice, legitimacy, 
and citizens’ compliance with the law. The theory rests on two fundamental claims: 
(1) people comply with the law and cooperate with legal authorities to the extent 
that they perceive the police and the justice system to be legitimate, and (2) their 
perceptions of legitimacy are shaped by their experiences and interactions with the 
police and the justice system.99 Of critical importance is the assessment of the 
procedural justice inherent in those interactions, rather than the favorability of the 
outcomes that follow from those interactions. Assessments of procedural justice are 
driven by the perceived quality of decision-making—the extent to which legal 
 
97. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975); TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 8; Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra 
note 8; Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 8. 
98. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 8; Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 8; 
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 8. 
99. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 8; Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 8; 
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 8. 
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authorities are seen as impartial and unbiased, and by the perceived quality of the 
interpersonal interactions—and the extent to which citizens feel that they are 
treated with courtesy, dignity, and respect. These connections—between personal 
interactions, perceptions of legitimacy, and compliance—have been observed in 
several empirical studies.100 It is clear from these studies that citizens’ acceptance of 
legal decisions and compliance with the law are driven in large part by their 
perceived legitimacy of the justice system, which cannot be reduced to legal 
outcomes.101 It is not hard to imagine that a witness subjected to the “Or-Else” 
identification procedure would form a negative view of the justice system, and 
would be less likely to report crimes to the police in the future.102 
The limitation of this approach lies in its subjective assessment of procedural 
justice. In the same way that our sensory and perceptual systems are vulnerable to 
errors, illusions, and biases,103 so too are our perceptions of procedural justice.104 
Witnesses may be unaware of the extent to which a lineup administrator may 
influence their identification decisions. For example, in an experimental study by 
Clark, Marshall, and Rosenthal, lineup administrators made subtle comments that 
increased the overall identification rate, but most witnesses seemed to be completely 
unaware of the influence.105 More generally, lay people may underappreciate the 
effects of lineup instructions and blind lineup administration.106 In an archival 
analysis of known false identifications by Brandon Garrett, many eyewitnesses 
described the use of suggestive procedures, but seemed unaware of their likely 
impact.107 In addition, assessments of procedural justice may be trumped by moral 
 
100. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 8; Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 8; 
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 8. 
101. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 8; Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 8; 
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 8. 
102. TYLER & HUO, supra note 24. 
103. Descriptions of perceptual illusions can be found in any introductory psychology  
textbook. For two particularly compelling (and fun) demonstrations and discussions of perceptual 
illusions, see LAWRENCE D. ROSENBLUM, SEE WHAT I’M SAYING: THE EXTRAORDINARY POWERS 
OF OUR FIVE SENSES (2010) and AL SECKEL, INCREDIBLE VISUAL ILLUSIONS (2003). 
104. This analogy is probably a bit too strong, as it assumes that there is a reality to procedural 
justice in the same way that there is a reality to perceptual experience. 
105. Steven E. Clark et al., Lineup Administrator Influences on Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 
15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 63, 74–75 (2009); see also Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret B. Kovera, 
Instruction Bias and Lineup Presentation Moderate the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on Eyewitness 
Identification, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 70, 73 (2009). 
106. See Sarah L. Desmarais & J. Don Read, After 30 Years, What Do We Know About What 
Jurors Know? A Meta-Analytic Review of Lay Knowledge Regarding Eyewitness Factors, 35 L. &  
HUM. BEHAV. 200, 203, 206 (2011); Daniel B. Wright et al., Turning a Blind Eye to Double Blind Line-
Ups, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 849, 854–55 (2010). 
107. Brandon L. Garrett, Appendix: Characteristics of Eyewitness Misidentifications in DNA 
Exonerees’ Trials, in CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 
22–23, 40 (2011). For example, witnesses testified about suggestive statements, suggestive instructions, 
and biased lineups. In the case of Thomas Doswell, the witness was asked about the fact that Doswell 
(and no one else) had a letter “R” on his photograph (“Q. That didn’t affect your determination [about] 
who it might be, did it? A. No.”). In the case of Larry Mayes, the witness initially identified a lineup 
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values108 and outcome favorability.109 In other words, people may rate procedures 
as being more just when they lead to preferred outcomes or outcomes that align 
with their deeply-held moral beliefs. These results suggest that witnesses may fail to 
see or appreciate the influence of certain suggestive identification procedures—
provided that they like the outcome. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
witnesses can have the subjective feeling that they are participating in the 
identification process in a meaningful way, when in fact, the police are so intent on 
obtaining a particular outcome, that the witness’s participation is functionally 
meaningless. We take up this issue of meaningful participation next. 
B. Normative Theory of Procedural Justice 
Subjective assessment of procedural justice in police-citizen interactions is a 
necessary, but insufficient, component of a theory of procedural justice. 
Development of the normative components requires a different approach. 
Subjective assessments are typically obtained through questionnaires and surveys, 
whereas the normative assessments are derived from fundamental principles of 
justice. Unsurprisingly, the theory outlined here is informed by the foundational 
work of Rawls’ Theory of Justice,110 but the specifics borrow from Solum’s concept 
of meaningful participation and Wells et al.’s arguments regarding legitimacy and 
memory.111 
1. Meaningful Participation 
Solum argued as a fundamental principle that “meaningful participation is an 
essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms,”112 
and is “essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudicative processes.”113 That 
participation must be “meaningful” is of critical importance. At its worst, non-
meaningful participation in human affairs reduces to a con-game of “cooling the 
mark out,”114 or something akin to a conversation with a customer service 
representative who politely recites a corporate apology for “your inconvenience,” 
but has no ability or intention of responding to your problems or concerns.115 We 
may feel empowered by having our day in court, but we are powerless if we stand 
 
filler, and stated that the police “told me to stop and take a good look . . . .” The witness explained 
away the filler identification with, “I was nervous.” 
108. Linda J. Skitka et al., Limits on Legitimacy: Moral and Religious Convictions as Constraints 
on Deference to Authority, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 567, 573 (2009). 
109. Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision Making, 8 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 709 (2011). 
110. RAWLS, supra note 78. 
111. Wells et al., supra note 13. 
112. Solum, supra note 12, at 183. 
113. Id. at 275. 
114. Erving Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure, 15 
PSYCHIATRY 451 (1952). 
115. Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural 
Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 189 (2005). 
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before a court that is not listening, governed by laws that cannot or will not consider 
the content of our participation. Thus, taking aim at the subjective element in Tyler’s 
Process-Based Theory of Procedural Justice, Solum notes that the “value of 
participation cannot be reduced to a subjective preference or feeling of 
satisfaction.”116 We may believe that procedures are just to the extent that legal 
authorities treat us politely with dignity and respect, but this aspect of procedural 
justice is meaningless if our participation has very little chance of influencing 
outcomes or decisions. So then, what makes participation meaningful? 
First and foremost, participation is only meaningful to the extent that it can 
affect outcomes. This is not to say that the value of participation reduces only to its 
effect on outcomes, but rather that it can affect outcomes. Participation that is 
satisfying on the dimensions described in the Process-Based Theory, but has no real 
chance of affecting outcomes, is completely meaningless. Thus, if eyewitness 
identification procedures assure (or at least make it highly likely) that the eyewitness 
will identify the suspect, independent of the eyewitness’s participation in the 
process, then the procedure violates the most basic principle of meaningful 
participation. 
In addition, participation can only be considered meaningful if it is free of 
coercion and deception.117 Borrowing from Habermas,118 Solum describes these 
criteria in terms of “sincere beliefs” and a “rule against compulsion.”119 These are 
also foundational requirements underlying Rawls’ Theory of Justice. “[T]hese 
conditions must situate free and equal persons fairly and must not permit some to 
have unfair bargaining advantages over others. Further, threats of force and 
coercion, deception and fraud, and so on must be ruled out.”120 
This conceptualization of “meaningful participation” is critical to eyewitness 
identification because it specifies that the interaction between the witness and law 
enforcement should be no more and no less than what any witness would 
reasonably believe it to be: a request from law enforcement to determine what the 
witness remembers about the crime and the person who committed it. Its purpose 
is not to obtain an identification or a non-identification response, but rather to 
provide an instrument that allows a clear view to the witness’s memory. We expand 
upon this principle in the next Section. 
 
116. Solum, supra note 12, at 275. 
117. The rule against deception is routinely and legally violated in police investigations, 
particularly when police are interrogating a person they believe was involved in the crime or is 
withholding information. In such circumstances, police may, among other things, present witnesses 
with information they do not actually have. For example, they might say, “We have five witnesses who 
say you were there”—when in fact those five witnesses do not exist. See FRED E. INBAU ET  
AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 195 (5th ed. 2011). 
118. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). 
119. Solum, supra note 12, at 270. 
120. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 15 (2001); see also RAWLS, supra 
note 78. 
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2. Independent Memory 
Wells et al. have described legitimacy as a characteristic of the witness’s 
identification, independent of its accuracy.121 They attach the term “legitimate” to 
the identification outcome, rather than to the legal authorities or institutions that 
devise and carry out the procedures by which identification outcomes are 
obtained.122 This requires only a minor shifting of terms to shift the focus of 
legitimacy to legal authorities rather than outcomes. The legal authorities are 
legitimate to the extent that they develop and use procedures that obtain 
identifications that are legitimate. Their main premise is that an identification 
“based solely on the independent memory of the witness” can be viewed as 
legitimate.123 
The independent memory standard seems entirely reasonable and self-evident, 
and it would presumably exclude identifications made with no basis in memory, 
such as those obtained from the “Or-Else” or “Red Arrow” procedures. However, 
it is at odds with one of the most well-established principles of memory, the 
principle of cue-dependent retrieval.124 The principle states that what is retrieved, and 
importantly, what is not retrieved, from memory at a particular time depends not 
only on the characteristics of the memory, but also on the cues that are available 
and employed at the time of retrieval, and those cues depend on the form of the 
interviewer’s question. The implication of this is that the concept of a truly 
independent memory is an idealized fiction. Legitimacy, and the independence of 
memory, must be viewed in shades of gray, rather than black and white. Indeed, to 
the extent that all memory retrieval depends to some extent on the cues provided 
by the interviewer, the issue cannot be about whether the witness was influenced by 
the interviewer, but rather how the witness was influenced by the interviewer. 
Finally, although Wells et al. focus exclusively on the legitimacy of positive 
identifications, the term must attach equally to non-identifications. Identifications 
and non-identifications are legitimate to the extent that they are the product of the 
witness’s meaningful participation in the identification process and a product of the 
witness’s independent recollection. 
3. Independent Memory and Decision Processes 
It is clear from the theoretical analysis outlined in Section II that eyewitness 
identification outcomes are not based solely on an independent memory, but rather 
are the joint product of memory and decision processes. Eyewitness identification 
 
121. Wells et al., supra note 13, at 265 (referring to “illegitimate hits,” indicating the legitimacy 
applies to responses, rather than legal actors or institutions). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 264. 
124. Endel Tulving & Zena Pearlstone, Availability Versus Accessibility of Information in 
Memory for Words, 5 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 381, 389 (1966). See also Jeroen  
G.W. Raaijmakers & Richard M. Shiffrin, Search of Associative Memory, 88 PSYCHOL. REV. 93, 93 (1981), 
for an example of a computational model that embodies the principle of cue-dependent retrieval. 
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researchers have described a number of different strategies that witnesses might 
employ in making eyewitness identification decisions.125 The question here is: to 
what extent might these different decision strategies be viewed as legitimate or 
illegitimate? 
The most enduring answer to this question arises from a distinction, made by 
Wells, between absolute and relative judgment strategies.126 According to the 
theory, an identification based on a relative judgment is one in which the “witness 
seems to be choosing the lineup member who most resembles the witness’s memory 
relative to the other lineup members.”127 It is easy to see the problem that could arise 
from such a decision strategy—it allows a witness to identify a person who is not a 
particularly good match to the witness’s memory of the perpetrator but rather is only 
a better match than anyone else in the lineup. Wells contrasted the relative judgment 
strategy with an absolute judgment strategy, which requires that the match “must 
exceed some cut-off or threshold.”128 According to Wells, the relative judgment 
strategy is a “useful and unflawed strategy” if the suspect is guilty, but “fallacious,” 
“dysfunctional,” and “dangerous” if the suspect is innocent.129 
The absolute-relative distinction implies both a normative and a psychological 
theory. Normatively, it seems self-evident that a person should not be prosecuted 
for a crime because a witness judged him to look the most like the perpetrator, but 
rather because a witness judged him to be the perpetrator. It follows from this 
analysis that identifications based only on relative judgments would be illegitimate. 
As a psychological theory, however, the absolute-relative distinction is 
imprecise and may fail at both ends. At one end, a pure relative model makes a 
clearly false prediction: if a witness to an armed robbery (by any white male) were 
presented with a lineup consisting of George W. Bush and five penguins, he or she 
would identify the 43rd President with a high level of confidence. One may 
reasonably condemn as illegitimate all identifications based on such a pure relative 
judgment decision rule, but this might only provide guidance to condemn a decision 
strategy that almost no witnesses ever use. At the other end, a pure version of the 
absolute judgment strategy, with no relative component, may also fail as a 
psychological theory. With few extremely rare exceptions (i.e., perfect pitch), almost 
all human judgments involve relative judgments to some degree.130 Thus, it would 
 
125. David Dunning & Lisa Beth Stern, Distinguishing Accurate from Inaccurate Eyewitness 
Identifications via Inquiries About Decision Processes, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 818, 818 
(1994); Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 91 
(1984). 
126. Wells, supra note 125, at 92–95. 
127. Id. at 92. 
128. Id. at 94–95. 
129. Id. at 89; Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48  
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 553, 560 (1993). 
130. See Elke U. Weber, Perception Matters: Psychophysics for Economists, in II THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: REASONS AND CHOICES 163, 172 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan 
D. Carrillo eds., 2004); Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954); 
Neil Stewart et al., Absolute Identification by Relative Judgment, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 881 (2005). 
Final to Printer_Clark (2) (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2018  2:00 PM 
2018] LEGITIMACY AND EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 67 
not make sense to declare an identification to be illegitimate simply because it was 
based in part on relative judgments, as such a standard would render all eyewitness 
identifications to be illegitimate. 
The resolution, of course, is to assume that eyewitness identification decisions 
are based on a mixture of both absolute and relative judgments.131 This seems like 
a sensible assumption; however, the lines between legitimate and illegitimate in such 
a mixture model will be very blurry for two reasons: (1) the model begs the question 
of how large the contribution of relative judgment processes can be before the 
identification must be rejected as illegitimate, and (2) mixture models are difficult 
(if not impossible) to differentiate. Identifications that involve a very small 
contribution of relative judgment processes may be hard to distinguish from 
identifications that involve a very large contribution of relative judgment 
processes.132 
The importance of the absolute-relative distinction may not lie in the decision 
strategies per se, but rather the specifics of the police-witness interaction that lead 
witnesses to adopt one strategy over another. In the original formulation of the 
distinction, Wells suggested that witnesses may tend to make relative judgments 
when they feel compelled or pressured to make a positive identification, or when 
they are unduly influenced by lineup members that are implausible.133 
There is one last point to make before applying the Legitimacy Model to 
eyewitness identification procedures and reforms. None of the core concepts 
should be viewed as binary and black or white, but rather all are represented in 
continuous shades of gray. This is a core concept underlying signal detection and 
expected utility theories, but it must hold for less quantitative considerations of 
perceived and normative legitimacy, meaningful participation, and the 
independence of memory. In the same way that the match between a suspect and 
the witness’s memory of the perpetrator is a continuous variable, so too for the 
concepts associated with legitimacy. Legitimacy, meaningful participation, and the 
independence of memory should be thought of as distributions, not binary points. 
Institutions can be more or less legitimate, procedures can involve more or less 
meaningful participation, and eyewitness identification decisions can vary in terms 
of their basis in an independent recollection. Without this graded and shaded view, 
we can expect little progress, and much argument about whether a particular 
procedure or outcome is, or is not, legitimate. 
IV. APPLICATION TO EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION REFORM 
In this Section we apply the Legitimacy Model to current reforms and 
recommendations for eyewitness identification. Each reform is discussed in terms 
 
131. Steven E. Clark, A Memory and Decision Model for Eyewitness Identification, 17 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (2003); see also Clark, Probative Value, supra note 60. 
132. Dustin Fife et al., Revisiting Absolute and Relative Judgments in the WITNESS Model, 21 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. REV. 479, 482 (2014). 
133. Wells, supra note 125, at 94. 
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of procedural justice principles, empirical data on accuracy and effectiveness, and 
the resolution between procedural justice principles and empirical data. Table 2 
presents, for each reform issue, a summary of procedural justice principles, relevant 
empirical data, and a resolution between principles and data. 
A. Showups Versus Lineups 
Procedural Justice Principles  
 On the one hand, the showup procedure could not provide a more 
straightforward assessment of the witness’s memory of the perpetrator. In terms of 
the basic structure, showups appear to involve the witness’s meaningful 
participation and pass the independent memory standard. And yet, the showup 
procedure has been “widely condemned”134 as “inherently suggestive.”135 Despite 
that strong criticism136 showup procedures continue to be used under the 
assumption of a trade-off, not between different kinds of identification errors, but 
rather a trade-off between suggestiveness and the accuracy of memory. Specifically, 
showup procedures are often justified because they can be conducted quickly before 
the witness’s memory of the perpetrator has faded.137 The assumption is that there 
is an accuracy advantage due to being quick that more than offsets problems 
associated with a decision-criterion that may be inappropriately low based on the 
“inherent suggestiveness” of the procedure. 
Accuracy and Effectiveness 
 Direct comparisons between showups and lineups appear to show a clear 
accuracy advantage for lineups.138 However, most of the studies compare showups 
and lineups with the time between the crime and the identification held constant.139 
This may be an appropriate strategy, consistent with good experimental 
methodology, but in order to simulate real world conditions, the relevant 
comparison is between a showup conducted sooner with a live head-to-toe suspect 
and a lineup conducted later with head-and-shoulder photographs. 
Resolution 
 There is a surprising disconnect between near-universal criticism for showup 
procedures and the lack of relevant empirical data. The problem here is not that 




134. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). 
135. State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593–94 (Wis. 2005). 
136. WALL, supra note 47. 
137. See, e.g., DORIS CALANDRA & JOEL E. CAREY, FIELD GUIDE FOR THE CALIFORNIA 
PEACE OFFICERS LEGAL SOURCEBOOK (2005). 
138. Clark, supra note 26, at 240–44. 
139. Id. at 242. 
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B. Composition of the Lineup 
Procedural Justice Principle 
 The general guideline for lineup construction is straightforward: the lineup 
should be fair and unbiased such that the suspect does not stand out.140 This 
guideline seems consistent with the meaningful participation and independent 
recollection standards. A compelling demonstration of this consistency is provided 
by cartoon-like illustrations where the fairness/standout rule is violated. Elizabeth 
Loftus provides such an example in her seminal book Eyewitness Testimony,141 with 
a lineup showing a man with long hair and a beard, along with fillers as follows: an 
elderly woman in a wheelchair, a blind man, and a little kid blowing a bubble with 
bubble-gum. The punch-line of the cartoon is provided by the witness who points 
angrily and confidently at the bearded man.142 The identification is immediately 
seen as laughably absurd. The fact that anyone can pick out the suspect raises the 
question as to whether the procedure requires the witness’s meaningful participation 
or independent memory. 
Accuracy and Effectiveness 
 The intuitive solution is to construct the lineup with fillers that are similar to 
the perpetrator. In actual criminal investigations, the similarity of the fillers to the 
perpetrator cannot be measured directly because the identity of the perpetrator is 
uncertain. Thus, similarity to the perpetrator is assessed either through similarity to 
the suspect (who may or may not be the perpetrator) or through similarity to the 
witness’s description of the perpetrator (which may vary in its accuracy). In both 
cases, increased similarity appears to increase diagnostic accuracy (higher d’ ),143 
although again, much of this advantage is driven by earlier studies, with diminishing 
effect sizes from more recent studies.144 One question that remains is whether fillers 
should be selected based on their similarity to the suspect or based on their match 
to a witness’s description of the perpetrator. 
Despite the intuitive appeal, selecting fillers based on their similarity to the 
suspect may produce lineups that are biased by design. Bias is measured against a 
fair lineup standard which is that the suspect in a lineup should not be identified by 
a non-witness at a rate greater than chance.145 In other words if a non-witness can 
pick the suspect out of the lineup at a rate greater than chance, the lineup is biased 
against the suspect. The inherent bias in suspect-matched filler selection can be 
illustrated with a simple example and a simple question. Consider a case in which 
an innocent person becomes a suspect in a criminal investigation due in part to the 
 
140. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 29–30. 
141. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 145 (1979). 
142. Id. 
143. Clark, Probative Value, supra note 60, at 374–75. 
144. See Steven E. Clark, et al., Evolution of the Empirical and Theoretical Foundations of 
Eyewitness Identification Reform, 21 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. REV. 251, 258–59 (2014). 
145. See Roy S. Malpass & R.C.L. Lindsay, Measuring Line-up Fairness, 13 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. S1, S2 (1999). 
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fact that he fits the witness’s description of the perpetrator. Later, that innocent 
suspect appears in a lineup with five fillers who look similar to him (thus, he should 
not stand out). But here’s the simple question: how many people are in the lineup 
because they were judged to fit the witness’s description of the perpetrator? The 
answer is only one, and that one person is the innocent suspect. The five fillers 
were selected not because they were judged to fit the description of the perpetrator, 
but rather because they were judged to be similar to a person (the innocent suspect) 
who was judged to fit the witness’s description. The prediction that follows is that 
the innocent suspect will be the person in the lineup who is most likely to be 
identified.146 Indeed, this prediction is supported by data.147 
Given the nature of the problem with suspect-matched fillers, a reasonable 
solution is to construct lineups with fillers who, like the suspect, match the witness’s 
description of the perpetrator. There is an intuitive appeal in that all lineup members 
are in the lineup based on the same standard—they were judged to fit the witness’s 
description of the perpetrator. As a consequence of this intuitive appeal and strong 
results from an early experiment,148 the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) guidelines 
explicitly state that fillers should be selected based on their match to the 
perpetrator’s description rather than their similarity to the suspect.149 However, 
experimental comparisons between suspect-matched and description-matched 
lineups (beyond the original study by Wells et al.) show a surprising pattern. 
Description-matched lineups appear to be more biased than suspect-matched 
lineups and show lower diagnostic accuracy.150 
Resolution 
 The empirical data suggest that principles of fair procedure do not necessarily 
translate into fair outcomes. The selection of fillers based on their similarity to the 
suspect seems intuitively fair until one works through the implications of such a 
process and sees the data. The selection of fillers based on their match to the 
witness’s description would appear to deal with the problems of suspect-matched 
filler selection—again, until one sees the data. Thus, two procedures for the 
selection of lineup fillers—that both seem consistent with principles of fairness, 
meaningful participation, and the independent memory standard—do not appear 
to produce fair lineups. Moreover, the procedure favored by the NIJ report and 
embodied in reform legislation and best-practices appears to produce lineups that 
are more biased and produce less accurate identification evidence. 
 
146. David Navon, Selection of Lineup Foils by Similarity to the Suspect Is Likely to Misfire, 16 
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 575, 579 (1992). 
147. Steven E. Clark et al., Constructing the Lineup: Law, Reform, Theory, and Data, in REFORM 
OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 87 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2013). 
148. Gary L. Wells et al., The Selection of Distractors for Eyewitness Lineups, 78 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 835 (1993). 
149. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 29–30 (expressing a clear preference for 
description-matched filler selection, but notes that fillers may be selected based on their match to the 
suspect if “the description of the perpetrator differs significantly from the appearance of the suspect.”). 
150. Clark et al., supra note 2, at 180. 
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C. Instructions to the Witness 
Procedural Justice Principles 
 Eyewitness identification reforms have included a number of cautionary 
instructions to be given to witnesses. Most fundamental among these is that 
witnesses should be instructed that the perpetrator of the crime may not be in the 
lineup. The rationale for the “not present” instruction is that witnesses often come 
to the lineup with the expectation that the perpetrator will be in the lineup. 
According to this argument, it is a reasonable assumption that the police would not 
have contacted the witness for a showup or lineup if they did not have the 
perpetrator in custody. There is anecdotal evidence from known false identification 
cases suggesting that some witnesses do in fact carry this assumption to the 
identification.151 However, there is no evidence as to the prevalence of the 
assumption or the factors that moderate it. Nonetheless, if witnesses do assume that 
the perpetrator is in the lineup, the “not present” instruction presumably should set 
them straight. The procedural justice principle at work here is that witnesses may 
set an inappropriately low decision criterion based on their belief that the 
perpetrator is present, and that law enforcement carries a burden to correct that 
false assumption. 
Accuracy and Effectiveness 
 The results of experimental simulations show that the cautionary instructions 
produce a reduction of both correct and false identification rates, with no change 
in diagnostic accuracy (no difference in d′ ), consistent with a simple criterion shift 
explanation.152 
Resolution 
 As we have argued before, the placement of the decision criterion is justice 
neutral, and a more conservative criterion is not inherently more just or legitimate 
than a more liberal decision criterion. Nonetheless, the National Research Council 
recently endorsed the use of the “not present” instruction in its 
recommendations,153 raising the question: what is the scientific basis for the 
recommendation? Answering the question in ad hoc fashion, the most reasonable 
basis for recommending the “not there” instruction is its truth value. It’s true: the 
perpetrator may not be in the lineup, and it follows that a “not there” response is 
an appropriate response option. 
Moreover, the results suggest a straightforward means of dealing with the issue 
of criterion placement. Again, our principle is that justice is not determined by the 
placement of the decision criterion, but rather by the procedures and the 
interactions between the police and the witness that determine the placement of the 
criterion. It is not hard to imagine circumstances in which the police might recite 
 
151. Garrett, supra note 107, at 3 (The witness was asked, “Did you believe that person may be 
there at the lineup?” The witness answered, “I figured that being logical.”). 
152. Clark, Probative Value, supra note 60, at 365–66. 
153. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 46. 
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the admonition in such a way as to convey to the witness that a non-identification 
response is not only allowed but preferred. 
D. Simultaneous or Sequential Presentation 
Procedural Justice Principles 
The rationale for the sequential lineup is that it prevents witnesses from making 
identification decisions based on relative judgments that result in the witness 
identifying the person who looks the most like the perpetrator (or more precisely, 
is the closest match to their memory of the perpetrator).154 An example illustrates 
the rationale. Consider a simultaneous lineup, in which all lineup members are 
shown to the witness at the same time, where the suspect in position three is 
innocent but clearly the most similar to the actual perpetrator. Based on that 
person’s match-to-memory, relative to the other lineup members, the witness may 
falsely identify that person as the perpetrator. If that same lineup is presented 
sequentially, with one lineup member at a time, the witness may clearly see that 
number three is a better match than the first two lineup members, but decline to 
make an identification, in order to see lineup members four, five, and six. A false 
identification of an innocent suspect is thus less likely. 
Accuracy and Effectiveness. Sequential lineup presentation does reduce the 
false identification rate, but also reduces the correct identification rate.155 
Importantly, although early experiments conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s 
appeared to show an accuracy advantage for sequential presentation, this 
“sequential superiority effect” as it has been called,156 has essentially disappeared, 
and studies conducted since 2012 more often than not show higher accuracy  
(i.e., higher d′ and AUC) for simultaneous presentation than for sequential 
presentation.157 
Resolution 
 The procedural justice principles that motivated the development of the 
sequential lineup appear to be completely out of alignment with empirical data 
regarding the accuracy of simultaneous and sequential procedures. What is missing 
from the relative judgment analysis is that the side-by-side comparisons of lineup 
members—which is made difficult by sequential presentation—may actually 
increase the accuracy of eyewitness identification decisions. Specifically, the 
opportunity to compare lineup members to each other (in a simultaneous lineup) 
 
154. R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identifications from Lineups: 
Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556 (1985). 
155. Clark, supra note 26, at 241–42. 
156. Nancy K. Steblay et al., Seventy-Two Tests of the Sequential Lineup Superiority Effect: A 
Meta-Analysis and Policy Discussion, 17 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 99, 100 (2011). 
157. See Clark et al., supra note 105 (regarding the disappearance of the sequential superiority 
effect over time). See also Laura Mickes et al., Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis of Eyewitness 
Memory: Comparing the Diagnostic Accuracy of Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineups, 18  
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHO. 361 (2012), for an example of an empirical study that has shown a 
simultaneous lineup advantage. 
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may allow witnesses to focus on unique features that are diagnostic of guilt and 
ignore common features that are non-diagnostic.158 Particularly when lineup 
members are very similar, the opportunity to make side-by-side comparisons can 
help witnesses focus on the features that distinguish between two lineup members 
and focus on the unique features possessed only by the perpetrator.159 Comparisons 
among lineup members, long thought to be a source of identification error, appear 
to be a source of identification accuracy. 
E. Blind Lineup Administration 
Procedural Justice Principles 
 One of the long-standing concerns about eyewitness identification procedures 
regards the extent to which those who administer the lineup (police) may influence 
witnesses’ decisions or introduce misinterpretations and distortions in the recording 
of those decisions. The context of that problem is nicely described by Wells et al.: 
Common practice . . . is for the detective [who is] involved closely in the 
case, who knows which lineup member is the suspect, to administer the 
lineup. This person contacts the eyewitness, tells the eyewitness about the 
impending lineup or photospread, instructs the eyewitness, maintains a 
physical presence with the eyewitness during the interview, answers 
questions that the eyewitness might have, asks the eyewitness to indicate a 
choice, records the answers, and so on. This interaction . . . is a highly 
interpersonal process.160 
Some law enforcement guidelines have stated that the lineup administrator 
should not say or do anything that would influence the witness’s decision.161 
However, such a guideline is much too broad and fails to consider the cue-
dependent nature of memory. It is also the case that some recommended 
procedures are designed for the very purpose of influencing the witness. The 
instructions to the witness are a case in point. The point of those instructions is 
precisely to influence the witness’s decision-making. It is psychologically naïve to 
think that lineup administrators will not influence witnesses. The issue cannot be 
about whether lineup administrators will influence witnesses, but rather about how 
lineup administrators will influence witnesses and what the nature of that influence 
will be. 
It is useful to start with the easy aspects of this, and then work our way toward 
the more complicated and difficult aspects. To begin, the act of deliberately steering 
a witness to make an identification of the suspect violates the principle of 
meaningful participation. Such manipulation is not intended to find out what the 
witness remembers, but rather to simply get the witness to conform to the lineup 
 
158. Wixted & Mickes, supra note 65. 
159. Molly B. Moreland & Steven E. Clark, Absolute and Relative Decision Processes in 
Eyewitness Identification (Oct. 6, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
160. Wells et al., supra note 2, at 627. 
161. See e.g., CALANDRA & CAREY, supra note 137; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 33. 
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administrator’s view. The meaningful participation principle prohibits the “Or-
Else” and “Red Arrow” lineup procedures, but those are the easy cases. 
Next, we apply the independent recollection standard. To the extent that the 
lineup administrator influences the witness’s decision, that decision is not based on 
the witness’s independent recollection, and the identification is deemed illegitimate. 
However, it is not that simple. A true statement by the lineup administrator that had 
a positive effect on the witness’s retrieval of information from memory might be 
considered legitimate by the independent recollection standard. Consider the 
statement, “I notice you paused on number three,”162 and assume that the witness 
actually did pause on number three. Would the identification be considered 
illegitimate if the comment initiated a conversation between the lineup 
administrator and the witness that resulted in the witness recalling from memory an 
important detail about the perpetrator that lead the witness to (a) correctly identify 
number three as the perpetrator, or (b) correctly reject number three as a filler? 
This level of analysis is typically not considered in the discussion about 
eyewitness identification reform. Rather, social scientists have proposed a 
straightforward, broad-brush solution to the problem, which is to conduct 
eyewitness identification procedures using a double-blind procedure in which 
neither the witness nor the lineup administrator knows the position of the suspect 
in the lineup.163 Blind procedures have a solid footing in scientific methodology that 
goes back well over a hundred years.164 The principle is simple: one cannot 
inadvertently leak one’s expectations to the witness if one does not have 
expectations, and one cannot deliberately steer the witness toward the suspect if one 
does not know where the suspect is in the lineup. 
Blind lineup administration is also deeply connected to the core of Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice. In Rawls’ theory, the principles of justice for a society are those that 
would be determined by rational and self-interested individuals situated behind a 
hypothetical veil of ignorance.165 “Among the essential features of this situation is that 
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone 
know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, 
strength, and the like.”166 Further, the veil of ignorance “excludes the knowledge of 
those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their 
prejudices.”167 
Veils of ignorance are not merely hypothetical inventions. Veils of ignorance 
exist in Sections 9 and 10 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution which prohibit 
 
162. Bill Nettles et al., Eyewitness Identification: ‘I Noticed You Paused on Number Three’, 
CHAMPION, Nov. 1996, at 11, 12. 
163. Wells et al., supra note 3. 
164. See, e.g., M.E. Dean, ‘An Innocent Deception’: Placebo Controls in the St Petersburg 
Homeopathy Trial, 1829–1830, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 375 (2006); W.H.R. Rivers & H.N. Webber, 
The Action of Caffeine on the Capacity for Muscular Work, 36 J. PHYSIOLOGY 33 (1907). 
165. RAWLS, supra note 78, at 136. 
166. Id. at 12. 
167. Id. at 19. 
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Congress and State governments from enacting bills of attainder or ex post facto 
laws.168 Arguably, a veil of ignorance is cast upon the jury when a trial court excludes 
relevant evidence.169 Despite the cliché regarding ignorance of the law, ignorance 
may serve a necessary and good purpose in the law. 
One need look no further than the county courthouse to observe blind justice 
as a normative legal principle. Modern representations of justice are often depicted 
by the Roman Goddess, Justicia, with flowing robes, a sword, the scales of justice, 
and importantly a blindfold, which in modern times is interpreted as a symbol of 
impartiality and fairness. However, the blindfolding of justice has not always been 
viewed in such a positive light. In their recent book Representing Justice, Resnick and 
Curtis documented and analyzed the symbolism associated with the blindfolding of 
justice, from the 15th century to the modern era.170 For example in Sebastian Brant’s 
Ship of Fools, the blindfolding of justice represented “sin, ignorance, and 
mistakes,”171 judicial error, and “the ease with which . . . judges could be 
deceived.”172 The shifting interpretation of the blindfolding of justice captures a 
fundamental tension in the law regarding the role of ignorance—as incompetence 
and disregard for truth on the one hand, and as impartiality and neutrality on the 
other. 
Accuracy and Effectiveness 
There is at best only weak evidence that blind lineup administration increases 
the diagnostic accuracy of identification decisions, and some evidence that it may 
reduce accuracy. On this last point, we describe an experiment by Clark, Brower, 
Rosenthal, Hicks, and Moreland who trained their lineup administrators in how to 
push and steer witnesses toward the suspect without appearing to do so, and 
without ever mentioning anything about the suspect.173 They did not ever say, for 
example, “I noticed you paused on number three.” However, the lineup 
administrators intervened in subtle ways. For example, if a witness appeared to be 
leaning toward a non-identification, the lineup administrator would provide subtle 
nudges with seemingly innocuous encouragement to “just take your time and look 
at each photograph carefully.”174 If a witness made a tentative identification of a 
foil, the lineup administrator would ask for clarification, “Are you saying that 
number two is the guy who did it, or are you saying that number two looks similar 
 
168. See Akhil R. Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 
(1996); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001). 
169. Arguably, the laws of evidence exist because of the jury. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW (1898). See also Richard D. Friedman, 
“E” is for Eclectic: Multiple Perspectives on Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 2029 (2001), for a brief but 
interesting discussion of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance and the exclusion of evidence at trial. 
170. JUDITH RESNICK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, 
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011). 
171. Id. at 67. 
172. Id. at 69; see also Norman W. Spaulding, Facades of Justice, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1067 (2012). 
173. Steven E. Clark et al., Lineup Administrator Influences on Eyewitness Identification and 
Eyewitness Confidence, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 158, 158 (2013). 
174. Id. at 163. 
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to the guy who did it?”175 These tactics—which did not at any point explicitly direct 
a witness toward the suspect—produced substantial increases in both the correct 
and the false identification rates, and surprisingly produced a small increase in 
accuracy.176 The increase in accuracy is surprising, but other studies have shown 
similar results.177 
One explanation of these results is that it is easier to steer a person toward a 
correct answer than to steer a person toward an incorrect answer. The guilty suspect 
is likely to be a relatively stronger match to memory than an innocent suspect. As 
evidence of this explanation, lineup administrators intervened more often when the 
suspect was innocent than when the suspect was guilty.178 The increased 
discriminability in non-blind, steering conditions suggests that the interventions of 
the lineup administrators were not simply suggestive or coercive, but rather they 
had a facilitative effect on memory retrieval. 
There are reasons to think that the facilitative effects of steering will be even 
larger in actual criminal cases where investigators know about evidence pointing to 
the suspect’s guilt. Specifically, if lineup administrators encourage witnesses to make 
identifications, and do so selectively, only when there is other corroborating 
evidence of guilt, correct identification rates may increase substantially more than 
false identification rates. 
Resolution 
The contrast between principles of procedural justice and empirical results is 
surprising. Without the 20/20 hindsight of the data, one would not expect that blind 
lineup administration would decrease accuracy. 
The problem with witness-steering may not be about the accuracy of the 
evidence (which may actually increase), but rather may be about how juries interpret 
the evidence in the context of other evidence. For example, consider a case in which 
a murder victim’s property was found in the trunk of the suspect’s car. The non-
blind police officer who knows about this evidence and knows that the suspect is 
in position five in the lineup may intervene in the subtle ways described by Clark et 
al., resulting in the identification of that suspect. The jury is likely to erroneously 
believe that these two pieces of evidence are independent, which would seem like a 
powerful one-two evidentiary punch linking the suspect to the victim’s murder: The 
witness identified the suspect as the shooter and the police found the victim’s 
property in the suspect’s car. In fact, the evidence is not independent. The witness 
identified the suspect as the shooter because the police found the victim’s property 
in the suspect’s car. The property evidence influenced the behavior of the police 
officer who then influenced the behavior of the witness. The false assumption 
 
175. Id. at 164. 
176. Id. at 161 tbl.1. 
177. Wendy Alberts, Steering in the Eyewitness Identification Procedure (2007) (unpublished 
Master’s thesis, University of Leiden); see also Greathouse & Kovera, supra note 105. 
178. Clark et al., supra note 173. 
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about independence may lead the juror to give too much weight to evidence that 
appears independent when in fact it is not. 
This analysis suggests that administrator influence through non-blind lineup 
administration may still be inaccurate and ineffective in the long run of trial 
outcomes, even if it does increase the accuracy of the identification evidence. To 
the extent that is true, the prohibition on lineup administrator influence would be 
based on accuracy and effectiveness rather than a principle of procedural justice (in 
spite of arguments based on accuracy and effectiveness). 
F. Confidence of the Witness 
The two recommendations regarding the confidence of the witness appear to 
conflict with each other. First, a statement of confidence should be obtained from 
the witness at the time of the identification, and second, legal decision-makers 
should be cautious—perhaps even skeptical—of such statements. 
The first part of the recommendation is consistent with the intuition that the 
identification of a confident witness is more likely to be accurate than that of a 
tentative witness. We should put more trust in identifications like, “There’s no 
doubt in my mind—it’s number three,” than identifications like, “I’m not sure, but 
I think it might be number three.” This intuition—that confidence and accuracy are 
closely related—is embodied in court rulings that instruct trial courts to consider 
the confidence of the witness in deciding whether to admit eyewitness identification 
evidence at trial179 and instruct jurors to consider the confidence of the witness 
when determining how much weight to give to the evidence.180 The second part of 
the recommendation arises from social science research, which has challenged the 
intuition that confidence and accuracy are closely related. Based on this social 
science position, trial courts in Utah do not routinely include confidence as a factor 
for the jury to consider,181 Georgia no longer instructs jurors to consider a witness’s 
confidence,182 and jury instructions in New Jersey, revised in 2012, tell jurors 
explicitly that confidence is an “unreliable” indicator of accuracy.183 
Procedural Justice Principles 
 The justice principles apply to the trial court and the jury, rather than the 
witness. The recommendations regarding expressions of witness confidence are 
 
179. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 
199 (1972). 
180. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
181. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). See also UTAH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL MODEL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 404 (2d ed. 2016), 
which includes language for an optional instruction, which notes, “However, a witness who is 
confident . . . may be mistaken.” 
182. See Brodes v. State, 279 Ga. 435, 442 (2005); COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF 
GA., 2 GA. JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL § 1.35.10 (2017). 
183. N.J. SUPREME COURT MODEL JURY CHARGE COMM., NEW JERSEY MODEL CRIMINAL 
JURY CHARGES, NON-2C CHARGES, IDENTIFICATION: IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION ONLY (3) 
(2017). 
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based on an assumption that such expressions may be misleading to the both the 
trial court and the jury. 
Accuracy and Effectiveness 
 The empirical data strongly suggest that the Supreme Court had it right in 
Manson when it listed “the level of certainty demonstrated [by the witness] at the 
time of the confrontation” as a factor for trial courts to consider in assessing the 
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence.184 The critical point, highlighted 
here in italics, but not in the original, is that it is the confidence expressed at the 
time of the identification that is to be considered, not the confidence expressed 
months or years later at admissibility hearings or at trial. Despite claims to the 
contrary, the confidence expressed by the witness at the time of the identification 
is a very strong and reliable indicator of the accuracy of the witness’s 
identification.185 
Resolution 
 The implication of this strong confidence-accuracy relationship is that the 
reforms implemented in Utah and Georgia, and especially in New Jersey, may veil 
jurors from information that would be useful in rendering their verdicts. More 
importantly, the strong relationship between confidence and accuracy suggests 
another means of criterion placement—that also does not rely on outcome costs or 
base rates. Even if witnesses make low-confidence identifications ( low criterion), 
courts and jurors can effectively raise that criterion after the fact by excluding low-
confidence identifications from evidence at trial, and by giving less weight to low-
confidence identifications if they are admitted into evidence. 
V. THE UTILITY OF THE LEGITIMACY FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this Article was to situate eyewitness identification within the 
broader framework of theory and policy that assesses the justice system in terms of 
legitimacy, effectiveness, and procedural justice. Implicit in this endeavor is the view 
that accuracy is a necessary, but insufficient, index by which to assess the justice in 
the justice system. 
Research and policy regarding eyewitness identification have largely ignored 
issues of procedural justice, legitimacy, and other social values, and have focused 
rather myopically on false identifications of the innocent.186 This focus, which has 
dominated eyewitness research and policy for over thirty years, has been driven in 
large part by the false claim that false identifications can be reduced with no loss of 
correct identifications.187 There was no need to consider conflicting values—
between crime control and due process, or between accuracy and procedural 
justice—because the reforms were believed to involve no trade-offs and inflict no 
 
184. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. 
185. John T. Wixted et al., Initial Eyewitness Confidence Reliably Predicts Eyewitness Identification 
Accuracy, 70 AM. PSYCHOL. 515, 515 (2015). 
186. See Clark, supra note 26, at 238–39. 
187. See id. at 239. 
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costs. Previous work by Clark has shown that the trade-off between false 
identifications avoided and correct identifications lost can be measured and 
evaluated for various reforms, and policy recommendations can be made in light of 
that trade-off with a few assumptions about the relative costs of false identifications 
and false non-identifications.188 However, that policy framework, driven by utility 
theory, not only seemed incomplete, but also carried heavy moral and ethical 
baggage. Surely, there had to be more to eyewitness identification policy than 
calculations of expected utility. 
A complete framework for criminal justice policy must consider the 
effectiveness and utility elements—response rates, outcome values, and base 
rates—but must also consider elements of procedural justice and the legitimacy of 
legal institutions. Our goal in this Article was to pull accuracy and utility from signal 
detection theory under the broader umbrella of the normative psychological 
theories of legitimacy. 
There is no natural law that guarantees an alignment between justice and 
accuracy, just as there is no natural law that aligns moral imperatives with empirical 
facts, despite the fact that people often believe that such an alignment exists.189 
People have a tendency to believe that the facts support their moral positions and 
that the facts are on their side.190 In the case of criminal investigations, this suggests 
an alignment such that the Right (capital R) procedures (i.e., those that are 
consistent with our social values) will lead to the right (factually correct) outcomes. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the principles of procedural justice and 
the diagnostic accuracy associated with those procedures do not completely overlap, 
and thus provide non-redundant perspectives. Instructions that correctly 
acknowledge the uncertainty of identification procedures (i.e., that the perpetrator 
may not be present) do not increase the accuracy of the evidence. Procedures that 
seem intuitively fair for creating lineups do not seem to actually create fair lineups, 
and the preferred method of selecting fillers based on their match to a description 
of the perpetrator may reduce accuracy relative to the non-preferred (but perhaps 
somewhat flawed) procedure of selecting fillers based on their similarity to the 
suspect. Sequential lineup procedures that minimize the tendencies witnesses may 
have to identify someone because he looks more like the bad guy than anyone else 
in the lineup also do not only increase accuracy, but appear to decrease accuracy. 
There is also no compelling evidence that blind lineup administration increases the 
accuracy of identification evidence. The confused procedure of obtaining 
confidence statements and then effectively ignoring them based on concerns about 
reliability withholds useful and probative information from jurors. To the extent 
 
188. Id. 
189. Peter H. Ditto & Brittany Liu, Deontological Dissonance and the Consequentialist Crutch, in 
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY: EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF GOOD AND EVIL 51, 67 
(Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2012); Brittany S. Liu & Peter H. Ditto, What Dilemma? 
Moral Evaluation Shapes Factual Belief, 4 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 316 (2012). 
190. Liu & Ditto, supra note 189, at 316. 
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that policy decisions may be driven by a confused mix of social values and objective 
outcomes, it is important to know the extent to which such values and outcomes 
do and do not align. 
The analysis here suggests significant misalignment between diagnostic 
accuracy and principles of procedural justice. To that point, we make three 
comments: 
First, the misalignment may be due to a misspecification of the procedural 
justice model or an error in the translation between procedural justice principles and 
specific procedures. The clearest case of this is with the analysis of relative 
judgments and sequential lineup presentation. Although it may be true that an 
identification based only on relative judgments violates a justice principle, it does 
not necessarily follow that any contribution of relative judgments violates a justice 
principle. In addition, to the extent that the justice principle is correct—and that 
relative judgments should be minimized—the sequential lineup may have simply 
been the wrong implementation. Specifically, as a “treatment” it may have a side-
effect of reducing the witness’s opportunity to make important comparisons 
between lineup members. 
Second, to the extent that diagnostic accuracy and principles of procedural 
justice provide non-overlapping, non-redundant information, policy-makers have 
more useful information to consider. Procedural justice considerations augment the 
Effectiveness Model in useful ways. In particular, our analysis suggests that the 
problems associated with outcome costs and base rates attach only to issues of 
criterion placement; they are irrelevant to issues of diagnostic accuracy. Also clear 
from these analyses is that there are two ways of adjusting the criterion based on 
accurate (i.e., truthful) instructions and post-identification evaluation of witness 
confidence. 
Third, it is critically important to know where considerations of procedural 
justice and diagnostic accuracy are consistent and where they diverge. It is not 
unreasonable to implement policies that are consistent with principles of procedural 
justice and also likely to reduce the accuracy of eyewitness evidence or the legal 
procedures that rely on that evidence—provided that policy-makers understand and 
acknowledge that decision. There are many other instances in the justice system 
where the social value of accuracy is sacrificed to some other social value.191 
The accuracy and utility components of the Legitimacy Model are well-
developed and well-grounded. In contrast, ours is the first step in the development 
of a procedural justice model for eyewitness identification. The procedural justice 
model, like all social science models, is certainly incomplete and wrong in some 
important ways. Our hope is that we have provided a starting point and a foundation 
upon which others will build. 
 
191. LAUDAN, supra note 26 (arguing convincingly regarding various “truth-thwarting” 
traditions in the American legal system—and that the accuracy of trial outcomes could be increased if 
defendants were compelled to testify at trial, if statutes of limitations were waived under some 
conditions, and if the state were allowed to appeal a defendant’s acquittal by the jury). 
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Showup or Lineup? Showups do not violate 
meaningful participation or 
independent memory 
standards, but are “widely 
condemned” as inherently 
suggestive. 
Data suggest an accuracy 
advantage for lineups, but 




to choose fillers? 
Choose fillers based on 
match to description, not 
match to suspect to produce 
fair and unbiased lineups. 
Both procedures appear to 
be biased against the 
suspect. Accuracy is higher 
for suspect-matched filler 
selection than description-
matched filler selection. 
What to tell the 
witness about the 
procedure? 
Instructions should make 
truthful statements about 
the procedure. 
Instructions affect criterion 





The use of relative 
judgments should be 
minimized. 
Sequential lineups are no 
more accurate, and possibly 
less accurate than 
simultaneous lineups. 
Blind or non-blind 
lineup? 
Blind procedures minimize 
lineup administrator 
influence. 
No strong evidence that 
blind lineup presentation 
increases diagnostic 
accuracy. Non-blind lineup 
administration may have 
higher accuracy than blind 
lineup administration. 
Consider the 
confidence of the 
witness? 
Legal decision-makers 
should not rely on 
misleading subjective 
assessments of confidence.
Confidence is a strong 
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